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FRIENDS OF MAMMOTH AND THE CALIFORNIA EQA
The California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 (CEQA) 1 was
the first state law patterned after the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).2 Signed into law only eight months after the effective
date of NEPA, it quoted verbatim or paralleled closely many of the
provisions of the federal Act.4 Its key provision was an impact report
requirement, based on section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA5 and relied on by
environmentalists to compel serious attention to environmental factors
in governmental decisionmaking.6 CEQA's impact report requirement
1 Cal. Stats. 1970, ch. 1433, as amended, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21060-174 (West
'Supp. 1973).
242 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). The similarity between NEPA and CEQA includes
passages reproduced almost verbatim. See note 5 infra. This similarity was essential to
the court's holding in Friends of Mammoth. See text accompanying notes 11-14 infra.
3 NEPA was signed into law January 1, 1970. CEQA was passed by the California
legislature on August 21, 1970 and signed by the Governor on September 18, 1970.
4 See Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 39, - n.4, 500 P.2d
1360, 1369, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16, 25, modified on denial of rehearing, - Cal. 3d -,
502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). For an example of the similarity between
NEPA and CEQA, see note 5 infra.
5 The similarity between the two acts is evident from a comparative reading of the
sections requiring impact reports:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . all
agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives-to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
All state agencies, boards, and commissions shall include in any report on
any project they propose to carry out which could have a significant effect on
the environment of the state, a detailed statement by the responsible state offi-
cial setting forth the following:
(a) The environmental impact of the proposed action.
(b) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the pro-
posal is implemented.
(c) Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the impact.
(d) Alternatives to the proposed action.
(e) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.
(f) Any irreversible environmental changes which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.
Cal. Stats. 1970, ch. 1433, at 2781-82, as amended, CAi. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West
Supp. 1973).
6 See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dist., 27 Cal. App. 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197
(1972). For accounts of other cases filed under.CEQA, see 3 BNA E-v. REP., CURR NT
DEv. 457, 595, 801 (1972).
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was even more broadly cast in some respects than section 102 (2) (C).'
This expansive version of section 102 (2) (C) was to be applied to the
regulatory system of a state, vastly more diverse, pervasive and inti-
mate than the federal administrative scheme into which section 102
(2) (C) intruded so shortly before. It seemed inevitable from the
outset, then, that CEQA would have a profound impact on the course
of government and indirectly on the lives of private citizens in
California. The full dimensions of this impact were not appreciated,
however, until the decision in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Super-
visors.8
In Friends of Mammoth, the California Supreme Court held that
CEQA required a county planning commission to prepare an environ-
mental impact report prior to approving a conditional use permit for a
private developer. The decision raised the specter of near-total paraly-
sis of the state's present and future regulatory activities, as agencies
and municipalities wondered how to obtain the staff, money and
expertise necessary to meet the requirements it imposed, and to cope
with the inevitable delays. The California Legislature responded
quickly, however, with comprehensive amendments to CEQA which
went into effect only ten weeks after the initial decisionf By the
combined efforts of court and legislature, California now possesses the
most advanced and least ambiguous statute in the nation declaratory
of government policy and procedure respecting the environment. Its
significance is national in scope, because many of the problems Cali-
fornia has had to deal with can occur, and have occurred, in connection
with similar legislation elsewhere.1" States which are considering
enacting environmental statutes, or amending existing laws, would do
well to learn from California's experience. This Comment will discuss
the background, nature and future prospects of CEQA, and the ways
in which it has solved-or perpetuated-problems attending the
impact report requirement.
I. Friends of Mammoth
A private developer had obtained a conditional use permit to
build a complex of condominiums and shops on five and one-half acres
of Mono County, a sparsely populated area described by the court as
"primarily mountainous and open range land . . . . one of the na-
7 While NEPA requires reports only on "major Federal actions significantly affecting"
the environment, CEQA applies to any project which may have a significant effect. See
note Sa supra. For the significance that should be attributed to CEQA's substitution of
"project" for "actions," see text following note 17 infra. The amendments retain the rele-
vant language of the original section, but place other restrictions on the requirement. See
notes 25-50 infra & accompanying text.
8 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1360, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16, modified on denial of rehearing, -
Cal. 3d -, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
9 CAL,. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21060-174 (West Supp. 1973).
10At least 13 American jurisdictions have impact statement requirements similar
to those found in NEPA. See note 78 infra & accompanying text.
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tion's most spectacularly beautiful and comparatively unspoiled trea-
sures."" The development was opposed by local landowners, who
claimed that it would create severe problems of water supply, sewage
disposal, snow removal, police protection and general diminution of
open space. Alleging noncompliance with CEQA in the failure of the
planning commission that issued the use permit to prepare an impact
statement, these landowners sought a writ of administrative mandamus,
attacking the validity of the permit. The superior court denied the writ
and plaintiffs appealed.
In holding that an impact report should have been prepared, the
supreme court was required to find both that the legislature intended
CEQA to apply to regulatory, as well as proprietary government
action, and that the language of the statute was adequate to achieve
that purpose. On the first question, the Act's sweeping declarations of
legislative intent aided the court.'2 In resolving the second issue, the
court was persuaded by the failure of the legislature to expressly
exclude private action under state license, coupled with references to
"agencies which regulate [private] activities"'" and to the environ-
mental responsibility of "every citizen '."' 4 Accordingly, the court
found that CEQA was intended to apply to the use permit in question.
In determining that the statute would bear the proffered construc-
tion, the court was confronted with the arguably limited applicability
of the impact report requirement for "projects they [local govern-
118 Cal. 3d at -, 500 P.2d at. 1364, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
12 The Legislature finds and declares as follows:
(e) *Every citizen has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and
enhancement of the environment.
(f) The interrelationship of policies and practices in the management of
natural resources and waste disposal requires systematic and concerted efforts by
public and private interests to enhance environmental quality and to control
environmental pollution.
(g) It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the state govern-
ment which regulate activities of private individuals, corporations, and public
agencies which are found to affect the quality of the environment, shall regulate
such activities so that major consideration is given to preventing environmental
damage.
CAL. P UB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West Supp. 1973).
The Legislature further finds and declares that it is the policy of the state to:
(d) Ensure that the long-term protection of the environment shall be the
guiding criterion in public decisions.
"(f) Require governmental agencies at all levels to develop standards and
procedures necessary to protect environmental quality.
(g) Require governmental agencies at all levels to consider qualitative fac-
tors as well as economic and technical factors and long-term benefits and costs,
in addition to short-term benefits and costs and to consider alternatives to pro-
posed actions affecting the environment.
Id. § 21001.
1' 8 Cal. 3d at -, 500 P.2d at 1366, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (emphasis supplied by the
court).
14 Id.
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mental agencies] intend to carry out."' To meet this contention, the
court had to first define what a "project" is. Since CEQA provided no
guide for definition, the court referred to interim guidelines promul-
gated under NEPA by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)"6
prior to CEQA's adoption. 7 Although NEPA's impact statement
requirement applies to certain "actions"--arguably a broader classi-
fication than "projects"-the CEQ guidelines designated "projects
and continuing activities" as a subcategory of "actions." It is under
this subcategory that a "Federal lease, permit, license, certificate or
other entitlement for use" is subject to the act.'8 The grant of a permit,
as in the instant case, was a project under the Council's guidelines
and, because of the close relationship of the California Act to the
federal Act, under CEQA.
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the words
"they intend to carry out" foreclosed application of CEQA to private
actions. Restricting the scope of the report provisions to include only
public works would defeat the purposes of the Act, particularly in less
populous counties, such as Mono, which are unlikely to have the
resources to undertake major projects on their own. The phrase was,
therefore, interpreted as a requirement that "government must have
some minimal link with the activity."' 9
On denying rehearing, the supreme court clarified and limited its
holding. It noted that CEQA required reports to be prepared only for
projects that could "have a significant effect on the environment,"2 0
a fact that had gone unnoticed in the earlier opinion. The court ex-
pressed its belief that this limitation,2' along with the typically short
15 Cal. Stats. 1970, ch. 1433, at 2783, as amended, CA. Pun. Ras. CODE § 21151
(West Supp. 1973):
[LIocal government agencies [which do not have an officially adopted conserva-
tion element of a general plan] shall make an environmental impact report on
any project they intend to carry out which may have a significant effect on the
environment and shall submit it to the appropriate local planning agency as
part of the report required by Section 65402 of the Government Code.
16 CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment-In-
terim Guidelines, 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CEQ Interim Guide-
lines], superseded by CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the En-
vironment-Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7723 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CEQ Guidelines).
17The guidelines were relevant legislative history because of the close relationship
between the two statutes. See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
18 CEQ Interim Guidelines, supra note 16, at 7391.
19 8 Cal. 3d at -, 500 P.2d at 1370, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
2 0 See note 5 supra.
21 [Clommon sense tells us that the majority of private projects for which a
government permit or similar entitlement is necessary are minor in scope-
e.g., relating only to the construction, improvement, or operation of an indi-
vidual dwelling or small business-and hence, in the absence of unusual circum-
stances, have little or no effect on the public environment. Such projects,
accordingly, may be approved exactly as before the enactment of the EQA.
- Cal. 3d at -, 502 P.2d at 1065, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 777. The court cautioned, however,
against abuse of the "significant effect" qualification to avoid preparation of impact re-
ports. Id.
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statutes of limitations applicable to challenging administrative action,22
would result in relatively little dislocation of past and present de-
cisions. Accordingly, it refused to apply its holding prospectively only,
or to postpone its effective date.
II. THE CEQA AMENDMENTS
The legislative response to Friends of Mammoth was swift. On
December 5, the legislature adopted amendments to CEQA, to go into
effect immediately.23 In general, the amendments ratified the court's
holding, even going so far as to state that certain key provisions were
intended "only to declare and to clarify existing law."2 4 Although pre-
pared in relative haste, these changes and additions show careful
drafting and reflect considered response to problems raised by cases.
arising under NEPA, as well as those growing out of Friends of
Mammoth. Review of the new provisions is instructive, particularly
in the light of continuing controversy over the construction of the
federal Act.
A. Statutory Definitions
Section 1 of the amendments provides exclusive"8 definitions of
the principal terms used in the Act. Here we find a statutory definition
of the "environment,"26 missing from both the original CEQA and
NEPA. By defining environment as "physical conditions" the amend-.
ments do little violence to traditional notions of appropriate environ-
mental concerns, while foreclosing any attempts to transform limited
judicial scrutiny of compliance with statutory requirements into a
general power of administrative review. NEPA's use of the term
"human environment"2 " has led courts to demand impact statements
based on unorthodox concepts of "environmental" issues: "environ-
ment," under some federal decisions, has cut loose from its antecedents
-the once-fashionable "ecology" and the antediluvian "conservation"
-and acquired sociological overtones.2" It can be assumed that the
2 2 The court noted that there was a 30-day statute of limitations in Mono County
for challenging a Board of Supervisors' decision, which the court considered typical.
8 Cal. 3d at -, 502 P.2d at 1066, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
23 CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21060-174 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970,
ch. 1433. The law was passed under the urgency provision of the California Constitution,
requiring a two-thirds majority in each house for an act to take immediate effect. CA.
CONST. art. 4, § 8 (West Supp. 1973).
24 Cal. Stats. 1972, ch. 1154, § 17, 1972 West's Cal. Leg. Serv. at 2647. The provi-
sions were those adding definitions of terms used in the Act. Id. § 1, at 2639; see notes
25-32 infra & accompanying text. It is possible, of course, that the quoted language was
also designed to ward off further judicial expansion of CEQA based on the amendments.
25 "Unless the context otherwise requires, the definitions in this chapter govern the
construction of this division." CAL. PuB. RFs. CODE § 21060 (West. Supp. 1973), amend-
ing Cal. Stats. 1970, ch. 1433.
2 6 Id.
27 NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970), quoted in note 5 supra.
28See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
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legislature was aware of this possible construction and made a conscious
decision to avoid it.
Also significant is the definition of an environmental impact re-
port as an "informational document." 9 Together with the amendments'
limitations on judicial review, 30 this denial of substantive controlling
weight to the report should place appropriate limits to private suits
seeking to delay or prevent projects by using the report requirement.
Such actions are essential to assure the proper degree of environmental
concern in government decisions, but they are also subject to abuse
by those seeking to substitute their judgment-or a court's-for that
of responsible agencies.
3
1
The legislature adopted the supreme court's construction in its
definition of "project."32 At the same time it exempted purely minis-
terial acts from the class of projects to which CEQA applies.33 This
limitation reflects the most significant policy behind the preparation
of impact statements: to assure that environmental issues will be given
their due weight in decisionmaking. The ideal impact statement serves
this purpose by placing all relevant environmental facts before the
body responsible for making decisions. An impact report would be of
no value to the official who lacks discretionary powers-whose duty, in
other words, is mandated by statute or regulation according to clear
objective criteria. An example of such an official is the civil servant
responsible for processing hunting license applications. Although it
might affect his perception of issues involved, preparing an impact
report would not in any way alter his behavior; for if a particular
application complies with formal requirements, the license must issue.
The distinction drawn by the amendments between discretionary
and ministerial acts places the responsibilty for report preparation at
the level of government where authority exists to act on the report. The
amendments thus implicitly recognize that projects which are minis-
terial at one level may be discretionary at a higher level. To expand
990 (1972), after remand, Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
93 S. Ct. 2290 (1973); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877
(D. Ore. 1971).
20 CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21061 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433.
3 0 See notes 64-76 infra & accompanying text.
31 This is not to suggest that an impact report can never be the basis for over-
turning administrative action; merely that judicial restraint is mandated. See notes 65-77
infra & accompanying text.
32 'Project' means the following:
(a) Activities directly undertaken by any public agency.
(b) Activities undertaken by a person which are supported in whole or in
part through contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance
from one or more public agencies.
(c) Activities involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license,
certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21065 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch. 1433.
33The amendments draw a distinction between discretionary projects--specifically
including zoning decisions-and ministerial projects. Id. § 21080.
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on the hunting license example above: a wildlife agency may have
power to set quotas for hunting licenses without being able to deny
individual licenses short of that quota. Restricting the report require-
ment to discretionary projects also avoids duplication at successive
levels of government, and assures that statements will be prepared at
the point in the hierarchy most likely to have the necessary personnel,
funding, and expertise for thorough and intelligent study. Finally, it
may also reflect a refinement of the requirements, developed in federal
law, that projects which may be individually insignificant, but which
together form an integral project with a significant impact, be con-
sidered in the aggregate for impact report purposes.3'
In administering CEQA, however, the California courts should
avoid the same tortured distinctions between "discretionary" and
"cministerial" acts that have plagued the law of governmental im-
munity and torts. The distinction here should be regarded merely as
an administrative housekeeping provision: ministerial functions should
be only those in which an officer or agency serves merely as a conduit,
with no legal power to alter the flow.
B. The Role of the Resources Agency
The relevant class of projects is narrowed still further by the new
section 21084, which gives the Secretary of the Resources Agency
power to make categorical exceptions to CEQA's coverage.3 5 Classes
of projects may be exempted if the Secretary finds they "do not have a
significant effect on the environment." 6 However, the Secretary is
not totally free to exempt classes of projects from the report require-
ment because a finding of significant effect is required by section
21083 (b) whenever "[t]he possible effects of a project are individually
limited but cumulatively considerable." If these two -sections are read
together, the most plausible construction is that only classes of projects
may be exempted that, considered as a whole, have no significant
environmental effect. A second, more refined reading is also con-
sistent with the statutory language and purpose. In the "aggregate
impact" situation, individual actions could be exempted as a class;
that is, no impact report would be required for each such act. The
class itself, however, would not be exempt. The responsible agency
would be required to report on the total impact of its actions, as well
as on any action it takes with respect to the whole class. To return to
the previous example: no impact report would be required for the
issuance of a single hunting license, even if issuance were discretionary.
But the agency would have to report on the cumulative effect of its
licensing, as well as that of periodically established quotas.
34 See CEQ Guidelines, supra note 16, at 7724 (1971).
35 CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21084 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433.
36 Id.
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In implementing section 21084, the Resources Agency originally
proposed exemptions to the impact report requirement which closely
paralleled those suggested by the court in Friends of Mammoth: 3 re-
pairs, maintenance or minor alteration of existing structures and con-
struction of individual, detatched, single- and double-family homes.38
A subsequent revision has extended the exemption to three- and four-
family units.39 There is little danger that these exemptions will be
abused, since the statute specifically applies to such aggregations of
individual building decisions as zoning ordinances, variances, and ap-
proval of subdivision maps." Even in the absence of specific require-
ments, the letter and spirit of CEQA and the amendments require re-
porting in those and other cases where individual exempt activities
combine to form an environmentally significant whole.
A more debatable exception appears in the Resources Agency's
second draft of the proposed guidelines. No report would be required
on agency projects to maintain, restore or enhance a natural resource
or the environment.4 The difficulty with this standard is that it ap-
pears to rely on the intent of the agency, rather than an impartial
assessment of a proposed project's real impact. Unless an agency pre-
pares the equivalent of an impact report for internal use, it cannot be
certain that the desired.result will be achieved. If such a report is
prepared, there is little reason for failing to make it public. The only
real effect to be anticipated from this guideline is the encouragement
of irresponsible agency action in carrying out projects without adequate
study of possible consequences. The guideline may also be invalid
under the language of CEQA. The Act requires an impact report
whenever a potential effect is significant; there is no further require-
ment that the effect be adverse. 2 CEQA also cautions against seeking
short-term environmental ends to the detriment of long-term goals;
the proposed guideline makes no allowance for a possible conflict
between the two.
37 Note 21 supra.
38 3 BNA ENv. RE p., CURRENT DEv. 1068 (1973).
39 LA. Times, Feb. 18, 1973, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
40 CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433.
41 L.A. Times, Feb. 18, 1973, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
42 It is necessary to note that not only are all significant effects not adverse, but also
all adverse effects are not significant. The statute requires a finding of significant effect
whenever a project "has the potential to degrade the quality of the environment . .. ."
CAL. PB. Rxs. CODE § 21083(a) (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433, at 2782. Although this phrase threatens to swallow up the exception for projects
which will not have significant impacts, courts can be expected to read CEQA as a whole
and avoid such a misconstruction. Degradation must mean more than any adverse im-
pact; the term connotes important and permanent deterioration and should be read in
that way.
As to whether effects which are not adverse can be significant in the federal con-
text, see CEQ, Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements-Proposed Guidelines,
38 Fed. Reg. 10856, 10857 (1973). These most recent -proposed guidelines suggest that
significant effects can include actions with both beneficial and detrimental effects even if
on balance the effects are beneficial.
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The power of the State Planning Office to propose, and the Re-
sources Agency to adopt, categorical exemptions to the impact state-
ment requirement, based on a finding of insignificant environmental
effect, is only one facet of their overall responsibility under the
amendments to provide guidelines for the preparation of the reports.
Section 21083 of the amendments43 directs that they provide guide-
lines which will assist agencies in making the threshold determination
that a proposed project may have a significant environmental effect.
However, the legislature itself provided only minimal guidance to the
Resources Agency in defining what constitutes significant impact, a
problem with which the federal courts have had to grapple." The
new section provides guidance only to the extent of establishing a
statutory ceiling on environmental effects which may be deemed in-
significant; that is, it mandates a finding of significant effect in broadly
defined situations.45 These situations closely parallel those requiring
an impact report under the CEQ guidelines46 cited by the court in
Friends of Mammoth.
The failure of the legislature to more specifically define significant
impact may be compensated for in part by the demonstrated willing-
ness of the Resources Agency to adopt concrete guidelines-at least
as to the types of projects covered. Besides exempting certain classes
of building permits,48 the Resources Agency's proposed guidelines
identify particular subjects of environmental concern. They are fre-
quently qualitative rather than quantitative in nature, enumerating
specific classes of actions without attempting to give content to the
43 CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21083 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433, at 2782.
4 4 See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct.
2290 (1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 367
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
45 Guidelines [developed by the Office of Planning and Research] shall spe-
cifically include criteria for public agencies to follow in determining whether or
not a proposed project may have a "significant effect on the environment." Such
criteria shall require a finding of "significant effect on the environment" if any
of the following conditions exist:
(a) A proposed project has the potential to degrade the quality of the en-
vironment, curtail the range of the environment, or to achieve short-term, to
the disadvantage of long-term, enviromental goals;
(b) The possible effects of a project are individually limited but cumu-
latively considerable;
(c) The environmental effects of a project will cause substantial adverse
effects on human beings, either directly or indirectly.
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21083 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch. 1433,
at 2782.
46 CEQ Guidelines, supra note 16, at 7724-25.
47 For a statute more dearly committed to this classificatory approach, see Iwo. ANN.
STAT. § 35-5303(c) (v) (Supp. 1972). It may be that an exhaustive list of projects deemed
to require impact reports will be more useful, in the ordinary run of regulatory activity,
than any attempt to refine the content of the "substantial" limitation to a workable
standard of universal application. The latter approach, more satisfactory to courts and
theoreticians, has the practical advantage of providing a guideline for the unique case
and the case of first impression.
4 8 Text accompanying notes 3 7-41 supra.
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT
"substantial" limitation. There is a suggestion of particular concern
about two subjects: increased traffic and threats to rare or endangered
species; impact reports are required on any projects affecting these
areas.
One of the originally proposed guidelines adopted a secondary
index of environmental impact, similar to one that has been applied
under NEPA:49 a report would have been prepared on a private
building project that could cause serious adverse public reaction based
on environmental issues.50 A strong reaction to a project by environ-
mentalists is a good indication that it may adversely affect the en-
vironment. In addition, preparation of reports on major projects-those
most likely to engender opposition-could avert undue delay by
removing at least one ground on which a suit might be brought to
forestall construction. At the same time, this proposed guideline
manifested concern that the impact report procedure not be made a
vehicle for expressing general disagreement with agency policy. No
matter how strong the public reaction, no report would have been
required unless the opposition had been based on environmental con-
cerns. Nevertheless, the revised guidelines omit popular opposition
altogether as an indication of substantial impact. This may have been
done out of concern over potential abuse, or because of the obvious
difficulty involved in assessing public reaction to a project in advance.
For the reasons just discussed, the original provision was a sensible
measure, and should have been retained.
C. Preparing the Impact Statement
CEQA as originally enacted directed agencies to recommend
legislation necessary to make their authority, rules, policies and pro-
cedures adequate to assure compliance with its requirements. 51 Friends
of Mammoth made it apparent that the legislature itself must devise
some machinery to permit regulatory agencies to handle the additional
burdens imposed on them. The amendments provide a flexible frame-
work within which individual agencies can accomodate their needs
to the statutory mandate.
Preparation of fairly detailed guidelines by a central state
agency5' should be helpful to local and other state bodies with less
expertise or specific concern for environmental issues. The history of
NEPA litigation demonstrates that even answering the initial question
49 CEQ Guidelines, supra note 16, at 7724.
503 BNA ENV. REP., CURRExN DaV. 1068 (1973). At least one federal court has
taken a different tack, reading the guideline as a requirement that there be public con-
troversy over the nature of a project's impact, not over the project itself. Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2290 (1973).
51 Cal. Stats. 1970, ch. 1433, at 2782, repealed by Cal. Stats. 1972, ch. 1154, § 8. See
CA.. PuB. REs. CODE § 21106 (West Supp. 1973).
G
2 See notes 35-50 supra & accompanying text.
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of whether a report should be written often requires considerable
travail.5" Without sacrificing the advantages of central administration,
the amendments give agencies the right to seek changes in the guide-
lines in the light of experience.5
4
An agency preparing an impact report can seek assistance from
virtually anyone with particular expertise in a relevant area. Con-
sultation with other agencies having jurisdiction over the project is
required.55 An agency may also provide for the preparation of impact
reports by contract.56 Finally, an applicant for a license may be
required to assist the agency by the payment of a fee, 57 submission of
information, or preparation of the report itself.5
Permitting agencies to seek help from the private sector in writing
impact reports is desirable in the state and local context. The alterna-
tive for most government bodies would be the creation of a separate
in-house staff of investigators. The practical difficulty of this approach
stems from the usual fiscal considerations, as well as the shortage of
personnel with the necessary training and experience. It is to be antici-
pated that professional consulting firms will be established in Cali-
fornia for the sole purpose of preparing impact reports for a number
of government bodies. If this proves impractical, a middle course is
available for licensing procedures. Data could be elicited from appli-
cants; interested environmental groups or the public at large could be
invited to comment on the proposal. The agency's function in writing
its report would then be chiefly evaluative. 9
53 See City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (ist Cir. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 460
F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 990, after remand, Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 93 S. Ct. 2290 (1973); S.C.R.A.P. v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C.
1972), rev'd, 41 U.S.L.W. 4866 (U.S. June 18, 1973); Silva v. Romney, 342 F. Supp.
783 (D. Mass. 1972).
54 CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21086 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433.
5 5 Id. § 21086. The amendments deleted a provision for mandatory consultation
with every agency having "special expertise;" the original language parallelled § 102
(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). Such consultation is now optional,
since an agency can consult with any "person," defined to include agencies.
56 CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433, at 2781-82.
57 Id. § 21089, amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch. 1433. While this provision should be
used primarily for private applicants, it authorizes one agency to collect a fee from an-
other. This would be the case if the lead agency-having principal responsibility for
carrying out or approving a project, id. § 21067, was not the agency proposing the
project. The cost of evaluation should reasonably be borne by the proposing party. This
provision does not authorize charging a fee for interagency consultation as long as the
agency seeking information is preparing the impact report.
58
1d. § 21160.
59 Because of CEQA's policy of full evaluation of environmental factors, agencies
which choose not to perform fact-gathering themselves should rarely base their impact
reports entirely on facts submitted by applicants.
The amendments permit agencies to compel applicants to submit an "impact re-
port." It may be suggested that this authorizes delegation of the entire preparation func-
tion. This argument has been rejected by a federal court, Greene County Planning Bd.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
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Agencies thus have a number of sources of information and
expertise which they can consult in order to prepare adequate impact
reports, and a number of ways of using those sources. Because reports
are subject to challenge for inadequacy, it is in the interest of appli-
cants and agencies to see that all relevant environmental considera-
tions are weighed. A finding of significant impact will not automatically
bar approval of a project, so there should not be too great an in-
centive to submit false or inadequate reports.60
The original provision for consultation with other agencies was
identical to that found in NEPA.6 Its limitation was presumably
undertaken in the interest of efficiency, although there has been no
indication that NEPA's requirement is placing an intolerable strain on
federal agencies. Because such consultation is still an alternative under
the amendment the latter may be seen as an attempt to provide
greater flexibility to state agencies, more likely to suffer from shortages
of resources. More serious is the continued failure of CEQA to provide
for post-preparation review of impact reports by other agencies. Under
section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, impact statements are circulated for
comment by agencies with special expertise in the environmental
issues involved in the proposed action.2 Such screening is invaluable
to agencies themselves and to concerned members of the public-still
primary watchdogs outside the initiating agency.3 The short statute
of limitations imposed by CEQA on challenges to impact reports
64
makes it doubly important that expert views be available if the public
is to have a ready basis on which to seek review when it is desirable.
D. Review of Administrative Actions
The final portion of this Comment focuses on the CEQA amend-
ments which prescribe the manner in which impact statements and
related agency determinations can be reviewed. The legislature clearly
NEPA, however, contains no explicit language similar to CEQA's new § 21160. Never-
theless, it can be shown that abdication of responsibility for final evaluation is improper
under CEQA. The Act's declarations of legislative intent, §§ 21000-01, demonstrate legis-
lative concern that agencies themselves give full consideration to environmental factors.
Moreover, amended §§ 21100, 21151 require that state and local agencies "shall prepare,
or cause to be prepared by contract" an impact report (emphasis added) ; a report writ-
ten by a license applicant does not fit that definition. To allow an interested party con-
trol over evaluation of a project's environmental impact would subvert the statutory
purpose.
60 Extended consideration of the question whether approval of a project, after a
finding of significant impact, can be set aside is beyond the scope of this Comment. See
notes 75-77 infra & accompanying text.
6 1 NEPA § 102 (2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970).
6 2 EPA has adopted streamlined procedures for reporting its evaluations. EPA, En-
vironmental Impact Statements and Other Actions Impacting the Environment-Avail-
ability of Comments, 38 Fed. Reg. 1955 (1973).
63 Neither CEQ nor EPA has authority to seek review of agency determinations
under NEPA. See NEPA § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970); Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 n. (1970).
64 CAL. PuB. Rls. CODE § 21167 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433.
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intended, by enacting chapter 6,65 to minimize the delay and disrup-
tion which inevitably accompany review. At the same time, the
amendments ratify the courts' exercise of a certain measure of control
over agency decisions pursuant to CEQA 6 Agency action may be
challenged on three grounds: (1) that a project which may have a
significant environmental impact is being carried out or was approved
without a determination of whether an impact report should be pre-
pared; (2) that the agency has improperly determined whether a
report should be prepared; (3) that an impact report does not comply
with the statute. 7 These classifications cover the range of claims that
an impact report should be written or modified. Specific attention is
given to cases in which changed conditions--either in the project or
the attendant circumstances-render a previously satisfactory report.
inadequate."'
The statute of limitations for filing a challenge to an agency
decision varies according to the grounds for that challenge; however,
in all cases, the agency must be served before any pleading may be
filed. 9 When the challenge is to the adequacy of a report or to an
agency's decision that an impact report is not required, a thirty-day
statute of limitations7" runs from the filing of notice required of an
agency stating whether or not an impact report has been prepared."'
While this period is short, it is an appropriate limitation in the
regulatory area.72 A successful applicant for a license or permit should
not have to delay unreasonably long before he can feel free to act in
reliance on it. The members of the public most likely to oppose a
permit are those in the area where the project will be located, or those
who are particularly concerned with that type of project. In many
cases the former can be expected to be aware that an application is
65 CAr.. PUB. R.s. CODE §§ 21165-74 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970,
ch. 1433.
66 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dist., 27 Cal.
App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972).
67 CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 21167 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433. Even though an impact report has been prepared and is adequate, there remains
a fourth ground on which a challenge might be based: that the agency's decision to
approve a "project" which the report covers is not supported by substantial evidence or
is arbitrary and capricious. Claims of this sort have been recognized under NEPA. En-
vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297-300 (8th Cir.
1972). Although it is not provided for in the amendments to CEQA, "substantive re-
view" might be recognized by courts. Its importance must be assessed in light of the
fact that no federal court has ever overturned an agency's decision on this rationale.
68 CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21166 (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970, ch.
1433.
6 9 d. § 21167.5.
7OId. § 21167(b).
71 Id. § 21152.
72 Similar statutes are typical of zoning ordinances. See, e.g., DEL. CODE AN., tit. 7,
§§ 7007, 7008 (Supp. 1972). The Delaware Coastal Zone Act, inspired by environmental
concern with industrial overdevelopment in the state's coastal areas, imposes a 14-day
statute of limitations on administrative appeals from licensing decisions, and a 20-day
limitation on subsequent appeal to the superior court.
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pending, and the latter can safeguard their interest by keeping abreast
of the public records in which the requisite notice must appear. There
will undeniably be some occasions when prospective opponents are
unaware of a project until after the limitation period has expired, but
in view of the need for efficiency it appears that this risk is not an
unreasonable one. If the statute proves overly harsh or subject to
abuse, the continuing concern of the legislature should supply an
appropriate amendment.7"
A more liberal 180-day limitation applies to challenges based on
an agency's failure to determine whether an impact report is required.74
The extension is necesary since in those cases no public notice is filed.
A thirty-day limitation could easily expire before an agency decision
became publicly visible, particularly if the proponent of a project
chose to lie low until the period expired.
Once suit has been filed, the CEQA amendments provide that a
familiar administrative law standard be applied by courts in reviewing
agency decisions: the requirement of substantial evidence.7" While
slightly different formulations are advanced, depending on the nature
of the agency proceeding in question, it is clear that only a limited
form of review-that appropriate to agency factual determinations-
is contemplated. Such deference to agency findings is wholly appropri-
ate: questions of environmental impact, which are essentially factual,
will be answered by those possessing the necessary ability, and the
weighing of competing considerations will be performed by the agencies
primarily responsible for making policy. Thus, this is a wise provision
if courts are not to sit in judgment generally over agency policy.
7 3 An outstanding example of a procedure designed to provide the widest feasible
notice of impending agency action is that recently established by the New York Public
Service Commission for licensing construction of large steam generating facilities. An
applicant is required to serve notice on any municipality where a primary or alternate
site is located; state legislators within whose districts primary and alternate sites are
located; designated state agencies; and other state and federal governments with juris-
diction over all or part of a proposed facility. In addition, notice must be published once
a week for 4 consecutive weeks in a newspaper or newspapers of general circulation
in the areas of primary and alternate sites. This notice must include, inter alia, a brief
description of the proposed site and facility; proposed primary and alternate locations;
the date an application was or will be filed; a statement that under the law a facility
may be approved that differs in whole or in part from the proposal; and, where prac-
ticable, the name, address and telephone number of the applicant's representative and
a member of the commission's staff who may be contacted for information and assistance.
Finally, notice must be directed to any person who, in the last 12 months, has filed a
statement requesting notice of applications with respect to facilities in the area of a pri-
mary or alternate site. 16A OriciAL COaNILATON-CoDEs, RuLFS AND REGULATIONS Or
TnE STATE OF NEW YORK § 70.5 (1972).
These regulations would be impractical for general adoption. They make a consider-
able amount of delay and expense inevitable. These are acceptable when applied to major
actions likely to he highly controversial, but would prove unworkable for an agency
passing on a significant volume of applications.
74 CAL.. PuB. Rvs. CODE § 21167(a) (West Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970,
ch. 1433.
75 CAL. PuB. RE . CODE § 21168.5 (Vest Supp. 1973), amending Cal. Stats. 1970,
ch. 1433. This differs from NEPA under which the issue of standard of review (to be
applied by courts to agency decisions) has not been uniformly resolved. See Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828-30, cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2290 (1973).
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It may be debated whether the amendments' standard of review
was intended to overrule dictum in Friends of Mammoth, that "if the
adverse consequences [of a project] to the environment can be miti-
gated, or if feasible alternatives are available, the proposed activity
• .. should not be approved."" At the very least, it now appears that
the existence of one of the above factors, without more, will not cause
a court automatically to reverse agency approval of a project. Emphasis
is shifted to an examination of the facts supporting a decision: only
if they are not "substantial" can it be overruled. On the other hand,
the impact report may disclose an alternate course of action which is
as desirable in all respects as the propsal, but much less destructive
of the environment. In such a case, approval could be considered an
abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole
record. More typically, an alternative's environmental benefits will
have to be measured against other weighty factors. These may include
cost, feasibility, or an individual's right to make a free choice between
reasonable alternatives. When balancing is required, the amendments
lend their weight to a presumption of regularity in administrative
choice. 7
III. CONCLUSION
Eleven states and Puerto Rico have adopted statutes or regula-
tions that require the preparation of environmental impact state-
ments.78 Others will certainly follow. Many present statutes are
patterned after NEPA; with few exceptions, they do not recognize
or deal with the major problems addresed by the California legislature
in the CEQA amendments. These include the scope of the impact
statement requirement, both as to the types, of actions covered and
the environmental effects deemed significant; difficulties due to the
fundamental difference between state and federal regulation; and
limitations on judicial review. As long as the public is concerned with
the quality of the environment, the same issues must eventually arise
in other states. It would be advisable for legislatures to seize the
76 8 Cal. 3d at -, n.8, 500 P.2d at 1371, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
77 It follows from this discussion that a proposed project with an adverse environ-
mental effect could be approved if no feasible alternative exists. The modified guidelines
proposed by the Resources Agency make this explicit, and recommend balancing of eco-
nomic and environmental factors. L.A. Times, Feb. 18, 1973, § 1, at 20, col. 1. Nothing
in the language or legislative history of CEQA or NEPA suggests that environmental
impact should be a controlling element in every government decision.
78 Statutes include DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 7, § 7005(a) (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 35-5303 (Supp. 1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 69-6504 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-20-6 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-4 (Supp. 1971); P.R. LAWs ANN.,
tit. 12, § 1124 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.030 (Supp. 1972); Ass.
Bill 875, 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 274. § 2, at 1043 (published Apr. 28, 1972). Administrative
requirements exist in Arizona, Game and Fish Comm'n, Procedures for Implementation of
Water Conservation and Water Recreation Development (May 27, 1971), cited in CEQ,
Tmiw ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 181 (1972); Hawaii, id. (1972); Mich-
igan, 3 BNA ENV. REP., CURRENT DEv. 1069 (1973); New York, 16A OEPIcIAL COM-
PILATION-CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 86.5 (1970).
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present opportunity for careful study of their own statutes and rules,
in the light of California's experience. Although a sizeable body of law
is growing up under NEPA, states may find that they do not want the
wholesale adoption of federal precedent by their courts. California
has taken the lead, under pressure of court decision. It is now time for
other states to emulate California's attempts to clarify vague statutory
language, reexamine requirements in the light of practicality and
necessity, and demonstrate continued dedication to the development
of a workable system of environmental protection.
